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This Article presents a mixed-methods study of 
misdemeanor bail practice across Georgia in the wake of 
reform. We observed bail hearings and interviewed 
system actors in a representative sample of fifty-five 
counties to assess the extent to which pretrial practice 
conforms to legal standards clarified in Senate Bill 407 
and Walker v. Calhoun. We also analyzed jail 
population data published by county jails and by the 
Georgia Department of Community Affairs. We found 
that a handful of counties have made promising 
headway in adhering to law and best practices, but that 
the majority have some distance to go. Most counties 
assessed do not assure a bail hearing within forty-eight 
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hours of arrest, provide counsel at the initial bail 
hearing, consistently evaluate arrestees’ financial 
circumstances, or guarantee release within forty-eight 
hours of arrest for those who cannot pay bail. In a 
combined eighteen counties, 37% of misdemeanor 
arrestees remained in jail for at least three days after 
arrest. In DeKalb County, 53% of all those arrested on 
misdemeanor charges between 2000 and 2019 were 
jailed for three days or more, but the annual rate has 
declined from 63% in 2009 to 26.5% in 2019. Per capita 
pretrial detention rates varied widely by county in 2019, 
with most of the higher rates in the southern portion of 
the state. Overall, the qualitative and quantitative data 
demonstrate both progress and substantial variation by 
county. 
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“To make a real impact . . . there has to be a deeper commitment to 
equity and not just doing things that will make for a good headline.” 
–Jill Cartwright, Southerners on New Ground1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Georgia, like jurisdictions across the nation, is undertaking bail 
reform.2 In the past two years, the state legislature3 and local 
federal courts4 have issued guidance regarding the post-arrest 
treatment of people accused of misdemeanors. In the face of a status 
quo yielding unnecessary wealth-based pretrial detention, 
activists,5 elected officials,6 judges,7 and lawyers8 have worked to 
 
 1  Aaron Morrison, Atlanta Bail Reform Is Leaving Behind Homeless and Mentally Ill 
People, APPEAL (May 16, 2019), https://cutt.ly/PryL46r. 
 2  See, e.g., COLIN DOYLE, CHIRAAG BAINS & BROOK HOPKINS, HARVARD LAW SCH., BAIL 
REFORM 5 (Feb. 2019), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/BailReform_WEB.pdf (listing 
jurisdictions that the authors consider “Pioneers of Reform” in this area, as well as 
jurisdictions that have made “[r]ecent [c]hanges” with “[p]romising [o]utcomes”). 
 3  See Act effective July 1, 2018, 2018 Ga. Laws 550 (2018) (providing guidelines on 
determining bail for those charged with misdemeanors); Atlanta, Ga. Ordinance No. 18-O-
1045 (Feb. 6, 2018) (eliminating the requirement of a cash bond for release in certain 
circumstances). 
 4  See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that 
the City of Calhoun’s “Standing Bail Order” did “not trigger heightened scrutiny under the 
Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence”); see also Mock v. Glynn, No. 18-cv-0025, 
2019 WL 2847122, at *1 (S.D. Ga. July 2, 2019) (providing an overview of when post-arrest 
treatment infringes constitutional rights). 
 5  See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Bail Was $500, Money He Didn’t Have. Atlanta Faces Calls 
for Change, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://cutt.ly/3ryGFYS (discussing the role of 
grassroots organizations like Southerners on New Ground); Gabrielle Hernandez, How 
Southern Organizers Are Leading the Movement to End Money Bail, SCALAWAG (May 17, 
2018), https://cutt.ly/IryGAaM (discussing the actions of Southerners on New Ground, a 
“queer Southern grassroots organizing coup”).  
 6  See, e.g., Rhonda Cook, Atlanta Mayor Signs New Ordinance Changing Cash Bail 
System in a Nod to the Needy, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/atlanta-council-oks-changes-cash-bail-system-nod-the-
needy/SW50dABJAtWgBwpB4vtgBN/ (discussing how the cash bail ordinance was signed 
and approved by the City Council “with a unanimous vote”); Emma Hurt, Deal Signs Bail 
Reform Bill, Closing Out Criminal Justice Reform Campaign, WABE (May 7, 2018), 
https://www.wabe.org/governor-signs-bail-reform-bill/ (discussing Governor Nathan Deal’s 
signing of a “bail reform bill” as “one of the final parts of his criminal justice reform 
campaign”).  
 7  See, e.g., Georgia Supreme Court Justice Appointed to Lead National Criminal Justice 
Board, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS JUST. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://cutt.ly/RryHK0t (“State 
officials across the U.S. have used the findings and technical assistance provided by the CSG 
Justice Center to develop legislative findings.”). 
 8  See, e.g., Challenging the Money Bail System, C.R. CORPS, 
https://www.civilrightscorps.org/work/wealth-based-detention (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) 
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highlight the harms caused by prevalent and long-standing local 
bail practices. Yet a crucial question remains to be answered: Have 
these reforms taken hold where they matter most, in jails and 
courthouses throughout the state?  
This Article assesses the state of misdemeanor bail practice in 
Georgia in the wake of reform. We deployed research assistants to 
watch misdemeanor bail hearings in jurisdictions around the state, 
interviewed judicial system actors in jurisdictions where we could 
not observe hearings, and synthesized publicly available data from 
jail websites. On the whole, the results of the survey suggest that 
reforms are not being closely followed—not a single studied county 
adhered to all legal requirements tested. Several counties studied, 
however, have made promising headway.  
To our knowledge, this study represents the first academic effort 
to assess bail practice on the ground across an entire state in the 
current era of bail reform. The reason, as we have learned, is that 
the diversity of local criminal justice systems makes such 
qualitative research extremely difficult. Yet, for the same reason, 
such research is all the more important. We hope that future efforts 
will improve on ours. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes why and how 
a bail reform movement has taken shape across the country. Part 
III outlines Georgia’s recent legislative and judicial developments 
on misdemeanor bail practice. Part IV documents our research 
methodologies and findings. Part V, finally, considers the 
implications of these findings and offers recommendations for 
concerned stakeholders. The Article ultimately calls for further 
attention to the unglamorous but critical next chapter of bail reform 
work: implementation on the ground. Until the developments 
championed as “reform” are realized by the thousands of Georgians 
who face arrest and accusation each year, the work is not over.  
II. THE IMPETUS FOR BAIL REFORM 
For decades, jails and prisons across the country have treated the 
rich and the poor differently in the period immediately following 
 
(“Our work has freed tens of thousands of people from jail cells . . . and is setting precedent 
that will forever change the bail-setting process in the United States.”); Fausset, supra note 
5 (discussing the role of a lawyer working for the Southern Center for Human Rights).  
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arrest.9 At any given moment, close to half a million people are 
incarcerated in America’s jails and prisons pending trial.10 In 
Georgia, recent estimates indicate that over fifty-six percent of the 
state’s jail population on any given day—21,121 of the 37,456 
total—are awaiting trial.11 In many instances, this pretrial 
detention stems from an inability to pay a sum of money, commonly 
referred to as a “secured bond,”12 in order to facilitate one’s 
freedom.13 Those unable to come up with the money remain in jail, 
awaiting minimal further process,14 public defenders who may 
never come,15 and a remote trial date.16 Many people plead guilty, 
 
 9  See, e.g., DOYLE ET AL., supra note 2, at 1 (describing how “[t]he practice of making the 
payment of a money bond a requirement for pretrial release discriminates based on wealth”). 
 10  Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://cutt.ly/YryFzfq.  
 11  VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION TRENDS IN GEORGIA 1 (Dec. 2019), 
https://cutt.ly/7ryL2Dn (providing figures from 2015). 
 12  “Secured bonds” represent collateral posted as a precondition of release from jail. See, 
e.g., HARVARD LAW SCH., MOVING BEYOND MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 6 (Oct. 2016), 
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf (explaining that “[a] 
secured bond typically allows a defendant to be released only after he pays the monetary 
amount set by the court”). Secured bonds can be forfeited if the accused fails to appear for a 
court appearance and a court deems forfeiture appropriate. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 17-6-70 
(2020) (explaining when a bond forfeiture is appropriate). “Unsecured bonds” represent an 
amount of collateral due in the event of a failure to appear, but payment is not a precondition 
to release from jail. See, e.g., HARVARD LAW SCH., supra, at 6 (“When bond is unsecured, the 
defendant will owe the unsecured bond amount if he fails to appear in court.”). 
 13  See, e.g., MARIE VAN NOSTRAND, NEW JERSEY JAIL POPULATION ANALYSIS: IDENTIFYING 
OPPORTUNITIES TO SAFELY AND RESPONSIBLY REDUCE THE JAIL POPULATION 14 (Mar. 2013), 
https://cutt.ly/6ryFOHp (documenting that nearly 75% of New Jersey jail inmates were 
pretrial, including 12% because they could not post bail of $2,500 or less). 
 14  See, e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *1 
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (“Plaintiff has asked officers at the Jail when he will go to court, and 
has received three different answers. Defendant holds weekly court sessions on Mondays, and 
new arrestees who cannot post bond must wait until the following Monday to see the judge.” 
(internal citation omitted)), vacated, 682 F. App’x 721 (11th Cir. 2017); ODonnell v. Harris 
Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 153–54 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The district court noted that the 
statutorily-mandated probable cause hearing (where bail is usually set) frequently does not 
occur within 24 hours of arrest. The hearings often last seconds, and rarely more than a few 
minutes. Arrestees are instructed not to speak, and are not offered any opportunity to submit 
evidence of relative ability to post bond at the scheduled amount.”). 
 15  See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2161–62 (2013); see also STEPHEN B. BRIGHT, S. 
CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROMISES TO KEEP: ACHIEVING FAIRNESS AND EQUAL JUSTICE FOR 
THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES 8 (Nov. 2000), https://cutt.ly/eryJi48 (reporting that indigent 
arrestees in Georgia often wait “weeks or months” before a public defender sees them in jail). 
 16  Georgia law requires that criminal defendants who demand a speedy trial be tried 
within two terms in which a jury is available. See O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170 (2011). In many 
jurisdictions, juries may only be impaneled once or twice per year. See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 
240 S.E.2d 37, 39 (Ga. 1977) (noting that juries are impaneled only in January and 
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regardless of valid defenses, simply to end the ordeal of 
incarceration.17  
The human and economic toll of these practices is massive. Those 
unable to afford money bail face the dangers and difficulties of jail,18 
are more likely to be convicted,19 and are more likely to face longer 
sentences.20 Even two days of pretrial incarceration may yield 
negative collateral consequences, such as an increased likelihood of 
recidivism21 or failure to appear.22 Those who must pay secured 
money bail, particularly those who depend on a commercial bail 
company to do so, often experience long-term economic setbacks.23 
Meanwhile, taxpayers foot the bill for the housing, food, and medical 
care of those held in jail. 
 
September); Treadwell v. State, 211 S.E.2d 760, 761 (Ga. 1975) (finding that a period of 
twenty-seven months’ incarceration did not violate speedy trial right); see also Dorothy T. 
Beasley, The Georgia Bill of Rights: Dead or Alive?, 34 EMORY L.J. 341, 356 (1985) (noting 
that, notwithstanding the long clock under state law, Georgia courts evaluating speedy trial 
challenges employ the even less protective federal speedy trial right articulated under Barker 
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)). 
 17  Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of 
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 747 (2017) (finding detained arrestees 
25% more likely than similarly situated persons to plead guilty). For a comparison of the 
pressures of criminal incarceration and the separation of parents from their children at the 
U.S. border, see Somil Trivedi, The Family Separation Crisis Exposes America’s Addiction to 
Incarceration, HILL (June 30, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://cutt.ly/TryXGwo. 
 18  Ned Parker et al., Death and Politics Roil a Georgia Jail, REUTERS (Sept. 4, 2019, 6:00 
PM), https://cutt.ly/vryXZUP (discussing prevalence of deaths, suicides, and lack of medical 
treatment in Chatham County Detention Center). 
 19  MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., A DECADE OF BAIL 
RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 116 (Aug. 2012), https://cutt.ly/MryX2sK (noting the conviction 
rate for nonfelonies is approximately 50% for those released immediately, and 92% for those 
detained until the conclusion of their case). 
 20  Heaton et al., supra note 17, at 717 (noting that, compared to those similarly situated, 
those detained pretrial are 43% more likely to be sentenced to a term of incarceration, and, 
when sentenced, to serve nine additional days on average). 
 21  CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL 
DETENTION 3, 22 (Nov. 2013), https://cutt.ly/LryX7Uw (highlighting that, when controlling 
by assessed risk level, persons incarcerated for two or three days pretrial have higher rates 
of arrest both during the pretrial period and longer term compared to those released within 
a day).  
 22  See id. at 10 (controlling by risk level, persons incarcerated for two or three days have 
higher failure to appear rates than persons released within a day). 
 23  See, e.g., BRIAN HIGHSMITH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., COMMERCIALIZED (IN)JUSTICE: 
CONSUMER ABUSES IN THE BAIL AND CORRECTIONS INDUSTRY 26 (Mar. 2019), 
https://cutt.ly/DrGgXBL (describing the standard commercial bail practice of requiring 
nonrefundable deposits regardless of case outcome, and that $16 to $27 million is extracted 
from incarcerated people and their support networks in a single year in New York alone in 
such deposits). 
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In light of these human and economic costs, our nation has 
experienced several waves of pretrial reform. The first occurred in 
the 1960s. In 1964, then-United States Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy commented on the state of the American bail system, 
noting: “[O]nly one factor determines whether a defendant stays in 
jail before trial. . . . That factor is simply money.”24 Kennedy 
stressed that such a system was both “cruel” and “illogical.”25 In 
1961, the Vera Institute for Justice and NYU School of Law 
launched the Manhattan Bail Project, which demonstrated the 
efficacy of release on recognizance rather than secured money bail, 
spurring a broader conversation about the role of money bail.26 And 
in 1966, the U.S. Congress passed the Bail Reform Act, which 
required that all persons accused of non-capital federal crimes be 
released pretrial, with a presumption that any conditions on their 
release be non-financial.27 
In the 1980s, another bail reform movement took hold. This 
second push was more concerned with public safety, and culminated 
in the passage of the 1984 federal Bail Reform Act—still in use—
authorizing increased pretrial detention in the federal system.28 The 
Act embraced detention based on dangerousness, which was 
extremely controversial at the time.29 In upholding the 1984 Act, the 
U.S. Supreme Court stressed the significant limiting processes it 
mandated prior to any individual order of pretrial detention, and 
affirmed the principle that “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and 
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited 
exception.”30  
We are now in the midst of a new wave of bail reform, focused, 
like the first one, on the inequalities and harms imposed by money 
 
 24  Kennedy Scores Bail Injustices; Changes in System Urged by the Attorney General, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 30, 1964), https://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/30/archives/kennedy-scores-bail-
injustices-changes-in-system-urged-by-the.html. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Marion C. Katzive, New Areas for Bail Reform: A Report on the Manhattan Bail 
Reevaluation Project 3 (Working Paper, 1968), https://cutt.ly/jryCjb3. 
 27  See United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 170–71 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (discussing the 
1966 Bail Reform Act). 
 28  18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2018). 
 29  See, e.g., Ann M. Overlook, Detention for the Dangerous: The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 
55 U. CINN. L. REV. 153, 154–55 n.7 (1988) (noting the legal shift was “significant”).  
 30  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).  
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bail. States like New Jersey31 and New Mexico32 have overhauled 
post-arrest procedures to increase release, improve due process, and 
ensure that failure to appear (FTA) and pretrial rearrest rates 
remain low. Activists33 and grass-roots community organizations34 
are posting bail for those unable to pay on their own, generally with 
great success,35 demonstrating that secured bail requirements often 
inflict needless harm. Further, a wave of lawsuits raising due 
process and equal protection challenges to money-bail systems that 
frequently result in pretrial incarceration has reinforced the 
principle that pretrial freedom should only be infringed in the most 
serious of circumstances.36  
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN GEORGIA 
 Georgia, too, has undertaken bail reform. In the past four years, 
two federal lawsuits challenged post-arrest treatment of low-income 
Georgians under local money bail systems.37 One of those suits, 
Walker v. Calhoun, resulted in a precedential decision from the 
 
 31  See Criminal Justice Reform Information Center, N.J. CTS., https://cutt.ly/qrGhgL5 (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2020) (providing a comprehensive overview of New Jersey’s amended bail 
reform system, including pretrial services and reports documenting data from years of 
implementation). 
 32  See, e.g., Key Facts and Law Regarding Pretrial Release and Detention, N.M. 
LEGISLATURE, https://cutt.ly/grGhmW4 (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (describing constitutional 
amendment and guidance from New Mexico Supreme Court overhauling money bail system). 
 33  See, e.g., Black Mama’s Bail Outs, NAT’L BAIL OUT, https://cutt.ly/mroKfsp (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2020) (annual campaign to bail out Black mothers before Mother’s Day). 
 34  See, e.g., NASHVILLE CMTY. BAIL FUND, https://nashvillebailfund.org/ (last visited Mar. 
17, 2020). 
 35  See, e.g., Our Results, BROOKLYN CMTY. BAIL FUND, https://cutt.ly/JrZeiyf (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2020). 
 36  See, e.g., Dixon v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:19-cv-0113-AGF, 2019 WL 2437026, at *2 (E.D. 
Mo. June 11, 2019) (articulating plaintiff’s claims of an unconstitutional pre-trial bail 
process), vacated, 950 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2020); Buffin v. City & Cty. of S.F., No. 15-cv-04959-
YGR, 2019 WL 1017537, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019) (noting claims the bail schedule used 
by the city was unconstitutional); McNeil v. Cmty. Prob. Servs., LLC, No. 1:18-cv-00033, 2019 
WL 633012, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 14, 2019) (examining plaintiff’s alleged Fourteenth 
Amendment violation claims); Schultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1362–63 (N.D. Ala. 
2018) (indicating one of the issues in the case was the plaintiff’s pretrial liberty and freedom); 
ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1058 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (discussing claims of 
due process and equal protection violations in setting a bail amount), aff’d as modified, 892 
F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 2018).  
 37  See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018); Mock v. Glynn, No. 18-
cv-0025, 2019 WL 2847122 (S.D. Ga. July 2, 2019). 
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Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.38 In February 2018, the Atlanta 
City Council voted to eliminate cash bail in many municipal cases.39 
And in 2017 and early 2018, a statewide task force convened by 
then-Governor Nathan Deal studied and issued formal 
recommendations for misdemeanor bail reform.40 This process 
resulted in legislation, Senate Bill 407 (SB 407), that the legislature 
signed into law on May 7, 2018.41 Taken together, SB 407 and 
Walker mandate speedy and adequate process for people accused of 
misdemeanors to ensure that no one languishes in jail due to limited 
economic means.42 
A. AMENDMENTS TO THE GEORGIA CODE 
SB 407 made several changes to the provisions of the Georgia 
Code governing bail in misdemeanor cases. It first authorized law 
enforcement to issue citations in lieu of arresting a person for a 
number of misdemeanors.43 It also amended the provision governing 
the bail-setting process. Prior to SB 407, Georgia law already 
included an absolute right to bail in misdemeanor cases.44 SB 407 
amended the Code to clarify that all but the most serious charges 
“are bailable by a court of inquiry,” including ordinance violations.45 
The bill further amended the statute to guide bail-setting courts 
more explicitly:  
When determining bail for a person charged with a 
misdemeanor, courts shall not impose excessive bail 
 
 38  See generally Walker, 901 F.3d 1245 (contributing to the creation of standards for 
post-arrest procedures in misdemeanor cases). 
 39  News Release: Mayor Keisha Lance Bottoms Signs Cash Bond Ordinance into Law, CITY 
ATLANTA NEWS LIST (Feb. 6, 2018), https://cutt.ly/MroHIwW (informing the Mayor of Atlanta 
signed the City Council’s ordinance into law). 
 40  See generally REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL AD HOC COMMITTEE ON MISDEMEANOR 
BAIL REFORM (2018) [hereinafter AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT] (discussing recommendations 
after a committee investigation into bail reform).  
 41  S.B. 407, 154th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ga. 2018). 
 42  See infra Sections III.A–B. 
 43  See Ga. S.B. 407 (outlining situations where it is appropriate for a law enforcement 
officer to issue citations); see also O.C.G.A. § 17-4-23(a)(2) (2018) (allowing the issuance of 
citations instead of arrest in certain circumstances).  
 44  O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(b)(1) (2018) (providing that “at no time . . . shall any person charged 
with a misdemeanor be refused bail.”). The only exceptions, in subsection (g), apply to appeal 
bonds. Id. § 17-6-1(g).  
 45  Id. § 17-6-1(b)(1). 
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and shall impose only the conditions reasonably 
necessary to ensure such person attends court 
appearances and to protect the safety of any person or 
the public given the circumstances of the alleged offense 
and the totality of circumstances.46 
Most significantly, SB 407 amended the statute to require that 
judges in all cases evaluate an arrestee’s financial circumstances in 
setting bail “as soon as possible.”47 The financial inquiry requires 
courts to consider: “(A) The accused’s financial resources and other 
assets, including whether any such assets are jointly controlled; (B) 
[t]he accused’s earnings and other income; (C) [t]he accused’s 
financial obligations, including obligations to dependents; (D) [t]he 
purpose of bail; and (E) [a]ny other factor the court deems 
appropriate.”48 Nothing in the revised statute prevents judges from 
setting unaffordable bail—and thus functionally detaining the 
person subject to the bail requirement—for any reason. Further, SB 
407 preserved the right of jurisdictions as a matter of state law to 
establish bail schedules—charts providing pre-determined bail 
amounts, usually based solely on charge.49 Pursuant to Walker, 
however, federal constitutional law constrains both practices.50 
B. WALKER V. CALHOUN  
Walker challenged the constitutionality of the misdemeanor bail 
system in Calhoun, Georgia. Maurice Walker, a fifty-four-year-old 
man experiencing a mental health disability, was arrested for being 
a pedestrian under the influence of alcohol51 and held in jail on a 
$160 cash bond requirement.52 Mr. Walker’s monthly income was 
$530 in disability benefits; neither he nor his family could afford the 
bail in his case.53 After five days’ incarceration without access to 
 
 46  Id. 
 47  Id. § 17-6-1(e)(2). The temporal limitation “as soon as possible” is not defined elsewhere 
in the statute.  
 48  Id. 
 49  Id. § 17-6-1(f)(1). 
 50  See generally Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding 
limitations on bail within the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution).  
 51  See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-95 (2020). 
 52  See Walker, 901 F.3d at 1251. 
 53  Id. 
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medication for his mental health disorder, Mr. Walker filed a 
federal class action lawsuit.54 The next day, he was released.55  
After Mr. Walker filed his case, the City of Calhoun amended its 
bail policies by issuing a “Standing Bail Order.”56 Under the 
Standing Bail Order, misdemeanor arrestees could pay a preset bail 
amount (determined by a “schedule” of offenses and corresponding 
bail amounts) and obtain immediate release, whereas those unable 
to pay the preset amount were provided a post-arrest hearing to 
evaluate their indigency within forty-eight hours of arrest.57 Public 
defenders were available at the hearings to assist those otherwise 
unrepresented in advocating for pretrial release.58 Under the 
revised practices, indigent persons who previously would have 
stayed in jail due to their inability to afford a bail requirement were 
guaranteed release within forty-eight hours of arrest because they 
received a hearing assuring bail would be set in an affordable 
amount.59 
Notwithstanding the revised policy, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Georgia issued a preliminary injunction in 
the class action.60 Relying on Bearden v. Georgia,61 the court held 
that even two days of detention for inability to pay a preset bail 
amount violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.62 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit 
remanded the case because the injunction was impermissibly broad 
(Walker I).63 The district court accordingly issued a more specific 
injunction.64 It commended Calhoun’s policy changes but again held 
that the incarceration of those unable to pay a sum of money for 
forty-eight hours, where those able to pay were released 
 
 54  Id. at 1251–52. 
 55  Id. at 1252. 
 56  Id. at 1252–53.  
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. at 1252–53, 1262, 1266 n.12. 
 60  Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *14 (N.D. Ga. 
Jan. 28, 2016), vacated, 682 Fed. App’x 721 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 61  461 U.S. 660, 661 (1982). 
 62  Walker, 2016 WL 361612, at *14. 
 63  Walker v. City of Calhoun, 682 Fed. App’x 721, 725 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 64  Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2017 WL 2794064, at *4–5 (N.D. 
Ga. June 16, 2017), vacated, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018). 
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immediately, violates the Fourteenth Amendment.65 The City of 
Calhoun appealed.  
The central question on appeal was whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibited the City of Calhoun from conditioning 
pretrial liberty on wealth for a period of forty-eight hours.66 It was 
undisputed on appeal that Calhoun’s revised procedures 
guaranteed release to indigent persons within forty-eight hours of 
arrest.67 The City also made defense counsel available at its release 
hearings.68 The question was whether the Calhoun violated due 
process and equal protection by allowing people with resources to 
obtain immediate release while those without resources had to wait 
up to two days for an individualized hearing. 
In an opinion authored by Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid 
O’Scannlain,69 the Eleventh Circuit sided with the City (Walker II). 
It held that Calhoun’s revised system of pretrial release for 
misdemeanor defendants satisfied the U.S. Constitution.70 It 
therefore vacated the second injunction and remanded the case.71   
In holding for the city, however, the Eleventh Circuit 
simultaneously affirmed federal constitutional constraints on bail 
practice. First, the Walker II court affirmed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment principles from Bearden72 and Pugh v. Rainwater73 
apply to detention on unaffordable bail, rejecting the notion that 
claims like Walker’s must be analyzed under the Eighth 
Amendment’s excessive bail clause.74 Walker II also accepted that a 
“total deprivation” of pretrial liberty triggers heightened scrutiny.75 
The court found that Calhoun’s Standing Bail Order did not permit 
a “total deprivation” of pretrial liberty for indigent persons, 
however, because it guaranteed release from custody within 
 
 65  Id. at *3. 
 66  Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1266 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 67  Id. at 1263, 1265. The court noted that preventive detention was not being imposed in 
“any form,” even de facto detention on money bail, because of this guarantee of release. See 
id. at 1263. 
 68  Id. at 1252.  
 69  Judge O’Scannlain was sitting by designation. Id. at 1250 n.*. 
 70  Id. at 1269. Judge Beverly Martin dissented from this holding. See id. at 1274–77 
(Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 71  Id. at 1272 (majority opinion).  
 72  461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
 73  572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 74  Walker, 901 F.3d at 1260. 
 75  Id. at 1261. 
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forty-eight hours.76 The majority deemed forty-eight hours’ 
incarceration to be merely a diminishment of pretrial liberty, not an 
“absolute deprivation,”77 and thus did not apply heightened scrutiny 
to Walker’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.78 Instead, it analyzed 
the claim pursuant to the “traditional due process rubric” of 
Mathews v. Eldridge.79 In doing so, Walker II stressed that pretrial 
bail determinations in Calhoun were individualized and never 
resulted in incarceration for more than forty-eight hours.80 
C. THE STATE OF THE LAW 
Walker II may not be the final word on the federal constitutional 
requirements for bail-setting. There is reason to think that the U.S. 
Supreme Court might ultimately interpret the Fourteenth 
Amendment to impose even more stringent constraints than the 
Eleventh Circuit did. To begin with, other federal courts to evaluate 
similar claims have applied a heightened standard of review rather 
than the traditional due process balancing test.81 As a matter of 
substantive due process, moreover, the government must generally 
satisfy heightened scrutiny before depriving a person of liberty 
without a trial.82 (Mr. Walker did not raise a substantive due 
 
 76  Id. at 1261–63, 1265. 
 77  Id. at 1261. This holding is based solely on the hybrid equal protection/due process 
claim, stemming from Bearden, that was before the Walker II court. The court did not rule on 
the required protections and procedures under substantive due process before the 
government imposes forty-eight hours of incarceration, as the question was not before it.  
 78  Id. at 1262. 
 79  424 U.S. 319 (1976); Walker, 901 F.3d at 1265. A small number of courts have 
subsequently referred to the analysis undertaken by the Walker II court as rational basis 
review, in error. See, e.g., McNeil v. Cmty. Prob. Servs., No. 1:18-cv-00033, 2019 WL 633012, 
at *12 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 14, 2019) (order granting preliminary injunction); Schultz v. State, 
330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1361, 1365 n.23 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (order granting preliminary 
injunction); Edwards v. Cofield, No. 3:17-CV-321-WKW, 2018 WL 4101511, at *1 (M.D. Ala. 
Aug. 28, 2018) (order denying motion for reconsideration). 
 80  Walker, 901 F.3d at 1252. 
 81  See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 162 (5th Cir. 2018); Buffin v. City & 
Cty. of S.F., No. 15-cv-04959-YGR, 2019 WL 1017537, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019); Dixon 
v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:19-cv-0113-AGF, 2019 WL 2437026, at *14 (E.D. Mo. June 11, 2019); 
McNeil, 2019 WL 633012, at *13. 
 82  See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“[T]his Court has said that government 
detention violates [the Due Process Clause] unless . . . in certain special and ‘narrow’ 
nonpunitive ‘circumstances,’ . . . where a special justification, such as harm-threatening 
mental illness, outweighs the ‘individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding 
physical restraint.’” (first quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); and then 
quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997))); ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 162 
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process claim83). Finally, courts evaluating the constitutionality of 
wealth-based pretrial detention post-Walker II have distinguished 
the facts at issue from those in Walker; not all jurisdictions provide 
the same protections and release guarantee as the City of 
Calhoun.84 
For the moment, however, the state of misdemeanor bail law in 
Georgia is as follows. Pursuant to Georgia’s amended bail statute 
and the federal constitutional principles outlined in Walker II, all 
courts setting misdemeanor bail requirements must inquire into the 
ability of a given arrestee to pay any bond amount, including 
evaluating any debts and whether the individual has dependents.85 
Further, under Walker II, any system that imposes secured bail 
requirements immediately upon arrest must likely evaluate an 
individual’s ability to pay within forty-eight hours.86 Finally, under 
Walker II, a local jurisdiction cannot confidently avoid a finding that 
it “totally deprives” indigent arrestees of pretrial liberty if it does 
not provide indigent defense counsel to re-evaluate bail 
 
(“[I]ndigents receive a heightened scrutiny where two conditions are met: (1) ‘because of their 
impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit,’ and (2) ‘as a 
consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy 
that benefit.’” (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973))); 
Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2014) (“If there was any doubt about 
the level of scrutiny applied in Salerno, it has been resolved in subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions, which have confirmed that Salerno involved a fundamental liberty interest and 
applied heightened scrutiny.” (first citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993); and 
then citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80–83)); see also Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (“We view such deprivation of liberty of one who is accused but not convicted of 
crime as presenting a question having broader effects and constitutional implications than 
would appear from a rule stated solely for the protection of indigents.”). 
 83  Complaint at 12–13, Walker v. Calhoun, 2017 WL 2794064 (N.D. Ga. June 6, 2017) (No. 
4:15-cv-00170-HLM). 
 84  See, e.g., McNeil, 2019 WL 633012, at *3; Schultz, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 1352–53, 1361; 
Buffin, 2019 WL 1017537, at *3. A second appeal of a case involving the Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of pretrial arrestees is pending in the Eleventh Circuit as of the time of 
publication of this Article. See Schultz v. Alabama, No. 5:17-CV-00270-MHH, 2018 WL 
4253645 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 2018), appeal docketed sub nom. Hester v. Gentry, No. 18-13894 
(11th Cir. Sept. 13, 2018).  
 85  See O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e)(2) (2018). 
 86  See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1266 (11th Cir. 2018). As amended, state 
law requires that these evaluations occur “as soon as possible,” and it is well established that 
“delay for delay’s sake” is unacceptable. See Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 
(1991); see also Buffin, 2019 WL 1017537, at *18 (noting that City and County of San 
Francisco appeared to have been “unjustifiably taking advantage of the 48-hour window” by 
not taking plaintiff to earlier available hearing dates). 
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determinations and ultimately guarantee release within forty-eight 
hours of arrest.87 
IV. EVALUATING FIDELITY TO THE GEORGIA CODE AND WALKER II 
ACROSS THE STATE 
A. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
In order to examine how closely local courts are following the 
guidance of Georgia’s amended bail statute and Walker II, we 
crafted a research study using a stratified random sample of 
Georgia counties. For each county, we sought to answer the 
following questions regarding misdemeanor bail process:   
 
(1) When bail is set, does the decisionmaker consider the 
arrestee’s ability to pay? If so, does that consideration include 
inquiry into resources, assets, earning/income, obligations, 
and obligations to dependents?88 
(2) Does the jurisdiction hold hearings to determine indigency 
and evaluate bail within forty-eight hours of arrest?89  
(3) Does the jurisdiction guarantee release within forty-eight 
hours of arrest?90  
(4) Does the jurisdiction provide public defense counsel when 
bail is set?91 
 
Georgia’s highly decentralized court system presented a 
significant challenge for this research. The state has 159 counties 
(more than any other state except Texas),92 which are divided into 
ten “judicial districts.”93 Almost every judicial district contains a 
 
 87  See Walker, 901 F.3d at 1266. 
 88  This is required by O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e)(2) (2018). 
 89  This is the timeframe deemed “presumptively constitutional” by Walker, 901 F.3d at 
1266. Further, O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e)(2), as amended by SB 407, requires a bail-setting inquiry 
evaluating finances occur “as soon as possible.” See S.B. 407, 154th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. 
(Ga. 2018).  
 90  The City of Calhoun, evaluated in Walker, did. See 901 F.3d at 1252–53, 1263, 1266 
n.12. 
 91  The City of Calhoun, evaluated in Walker, did. See id. at 1252, 1265, 1269. 
 92  See Georgia Judicial System Structure, REFORMGEORGIA, 
https://www.reformgeorgia.org/georgia-judicial-system-structure/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) 
(explaining Georgia’s 159 counties are “second only to Texas”). 
 93  Id. 
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number of “judicial circuits.”94 Most of the judicial circuits each 
contain several counties.95 Other than the Judicial Qualifications 
Commission, which is responsible for fielding complaints of judicial 
misconduct, there is no entity charged with oversight of the courts 
and implementation of state law or federal constitutional standards 
in the courts.96 This extreme fragmentation makes it difficult to 
study statewide practices. 
Given the impossibility of conducting research in all 159 counties 
during the timeframe for this project, we selected a representative 
sample of fifty-one counties for study.97 County targets were 
randomly selected based on judicial district. Where possible, six 
counties were selected from each judicial district (two districts 
contain fewer than six counties). These six targets included three 
densely populated counties98 and three less densely populated 
counties.99 Between the Fourth (Stone Mountain) and Fifth 
(Atlanta) Judicial Districts there are only three combined 
counties,100 so each of those three counties were included in the 
study.101 If a county ultimately presented insurmountable barriers 
to data collection, we excluded it from the sample. We did one round 
of random replacement for counties that presented initial barriers 
 
    94  See id. (“Georgia’s 49 judicial circuits then divide into the ten (10) state judicial 
districts.”). 
    95  See id. (depicting the composition of counties, judicial circuits, and judicial districts).  
 96  See GA. JUD. QUALIFICATIONS COMMISSION, https://gajqc.com/home (last visited Mar. 17, 
2020) (explaining that the purpose of the Judicial Qualifications Commission is to “conduct 
investigations and hearings with respect to complaints of ethical misconduct by Georgia 
judges”). 
 97  See infra Part VII. 
 98  Defined as counties with an above-median population density—measured by people per 
square mile in the 2010 Census—for that district. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEORGIA: 2010 
CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING 17–42 tbl.8 (Aug. 2010), 
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2010/cph-2/cph-2-12.pdf (listing the 
counties in Georgia and their respective population densities). 
 99  Defined as counties with a below-median population density—measured by people per 
square mile in the 2010 Census—for that district. Id. In some judicial districts (2nd, 8th, 9th, 
10th), a single county represented the “median” in terms of population density and was 
omitted as neither over or under the median. Id. 
 100  Due to this variation in the number of counties per judicial district (ranging from a 
single county in the 5th Judicial District to twenty-seven counties in the 2nd and 8th Judicial 
Districts), counties from judicial districts with fewer total counties are over-representative. 
See infra Part VIII.  
 101  Due to this variation in the number of counties per judicial district (ranging from a 
single county in the 5th Judicial District to twenty-seven counties in the 2nd and 8th Judicial 
Districts), counties from judicial districts with fewer total counties are over-representative. 
See infra Part VIII. 
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to court watching, but due to time constraints were not able to fully 
replace all counties where court watching was not feasible.  
In an effort to gain the best information possible, we utilized a 
tiered methodology to answer the four research questions in each 
county selected. As a priority method, the study authors and 
volunteer researchers observed misdemeanor bail hearings and 
interviewed court actors.102 Following each hearing or interview, the 
researcher documented her observations in a uniform 
court-watching form that we provided. We collated these 
observations and requested or conducted follow-up research as 
necessary. Court watching was ultimately achieved in thirteen 
counties.103 
While the researchers made their best efforts to observe hearings 
in person, it was not always possible due to scheduling constraints, 
a lack of predictable hearings in some counties, and the geographic 
range of target sites. Where court watching was not possible, we 
pursued alternative research methods, including reviewing public 
records and interviewing local actors with an interview guide. 
Terminology also varies widely across Georgia’s many counties. It 
was sometimes difficult to pinpoint the relevant court session, as 
the first time a misdemeanor arrestee is able to speak with a judicial 
officer about bail could be labeled an “initial appearance,” “first 
appearance,” “recorder’s court,” or “rights read” proceeding.104 As 
described in Section I.E, therefore, the findings described below 
represent an assessment conducted to the best of our ability given 
the nature and limitations of the data collection process. A copy of 
materials collected from each county is on file with the authors and 
available upon request. 
 We were ultimately able to answer all four research questions 
for thirty-three counties.105 In an additional seventeen counties, we 
were able to determine answers to some but not all of our research 
questions.106 This generally occurred because the interviewee 
contacted was unsure of certain details, or researchers were able to 
 
 102 We relied especially on law students from Georgia State University, University of 
Georgia, Emory University, and Mercer University, as well as undergraduate students from 
the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga. 
 103  See infra Part VIII.  
 104  See infra Part IX. 
 105  See infra Part VIII.  
 106  See infra Part VIII. 
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obtain only basic information about local court scheduling 
practices.107  
In addition to the qualitative study of misdemeanor bail practice, 
we conducted a separate analysis of jail data to identify high-level 
trends in misdemeanor pretrial detention. We created an original 
data set by scraping daily information from county jail registries 
where available online.108 The selection process for this second 
study was based on availability: sixty-two of Georgia’s 159 counties 
publish jail registries online and of those sixty-two, we selected 
twenty sites. Appendix C describes the methodology for this portion 
of the study in more detail. We also analyzed data published by 
Georgia’s Department of Community Affairs in its Monthly Jail 
Reports series, as described further in Appendix D. 
B. RESULTS  
Overall, the results of both components of the study were 
sobering. Not a single county studied satisfied all four criteria 
examined. Of the four, judges’ evaluation of ability to pay when 
considering bail at the first hearing after arrest had the strongest 
showing, with 48.65% of studied counties providing some ability-to-
pay inquiry. There was wide variation, however, in the rigor of the 
inquiry. Only three counties have systems in place that guarantee 
release for indigent persons who cannot pay bail within forty-eight 
hours of arrest, and only five provide counsel when bail is initially 
evaluated. The following Table presents our results at a glance. 
  
 
 107  Even preliminary information about bail setting and court schedules enabled us in some 
circumstances to answer research questions two and three: if a county never holds hearings 
to evaluate misdemeanor bail, or does so on a regular schedule less frequently than every 
forty-eight hours, the authors could infer that hearings were not assured within forty-eight 
hours of arrest, nor release guaranteed for anyone unable to pay the bail requirement set in 
their case. 
 108  Students from the North Oconee High School Beta Club, directed by Dr. Paige Cole and 
Richard Rosch, assisted with this process. 
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Table 1. Court-Watching / Survey Results. 
 
 
Court 
makes 
ATP 
finding 
Hearing 
always 
held w/in 
48 hours  
Counsel 
provided 
at initial 
hearing 
Release 
guaranteed 
w/in 48 
hours 
Relevant 
sample 
37 46 42 49 
% Yes 48.65% 41.30% 11.90% 8.16% 
 
The jail data, meanwhile, revealed that 53% of all misdemeanor 
defendants booked into the DeKalb County jail between 2000 and 
2019 spent more than three days in jail (emphatically 
demonstrating that there is no guarantee of release within 
forty-eight hours of arrest for those unable to post bond). Among the 
eighteen additional counties for which we evaluated 2019 jail data, 
the proportion of misdemeanor arrestees who spent more than three 
days in jail was approximately 37%. The average number of pretrial 
detainees per thousand residents on any given day in 2019 ranged 
from zero, in many small and rural counties, to more than five in 
others. 
Although the results suggest that, on the whole, Georgia courts 
are not adhering closely to either state or federal law, a handful of 
counties appear to be headed in the right direction. Many judges, 
sheriffs and court administrators are aware of recent legal 
developments and are making serious efforts to eliminate 
unnecessary detention. On the whole, however, even those 
promising jurisdictions need to either (1) provide their post-arrest 
process more quickly and/or (2) take the ability-to-pay inquiry one 
step further to assure release for those who have not been able to 
post bail by the time of a hearing. Ultimately, more work is needed 
by both local and statewide actors to ensure compliance with the 
new baseline presented by O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1 and Walker, and then 
to look towards best practices. 
The rest of this Section presents our results in more detail. 
Because the intent is for this research to provide a picture of 
statewide practice and a framework for further improvement, the 
authors do not report results for individual counties from 
court-watching or interviews. Detailed information, including notes 
from research volunteers, is available upon request. 
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1. Research Question One: When Bail Is Set, Does the 
Judge/Decisionmaker Consider the Arrestee’s Ability to Pay? 
Arguably, a mandate that judges evaluating bail consider an 
arrestee’s ability to pay is the clearest principle coming out of the 
amended Georgia Code and Walker. It was also the one adhered to 
most often: eighteen of the thirty-seven counties in which we could 
answer this research question undertake some inquiry into 
individual finances when a judge first evaluates bail.109 This 
constitutes 48.65% of the sample.  
There was, however, considerable variation within the ability-to-
pay inquiries provided. The financial evaluation ranged from formal 
financial affidavits gathering information about income and assets 
as well as debts, expenses, and dependents110 to informal 
evaluations, sometimes based on the judge or sheriff’s personal 
familiarity with the accused and their circumstances.111 
Researchers could only confirm that two counties undertook the full 
financial evaluation required by O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e)(2) by covering 
income/assets, obligations/debts, and obligations to dependents.112 
 
2. Research Question Two: Does the Jurisdiction Hold Hearings 
to Determine Indigency and Evaluate Bail Within Forty-Eight Hours 
of Arrest? 
Of the forty-six counties for which this question could be 
answered, nineteen (41.30%) provided hearings to evaluate bail for 
those unable to afford an initial bail (or who had not received bail) 
within forty-eight hours of arrest. Interestingly, a higher proportion 
of those nineteen counties, twelve of them, were among the lower 
 
 109  In many counties, bail is initially “set” according to a pre-set secured bond schedule, and 
those who can post the bond are released immediately, either directly from the stationhouse 
or quickly after they have been booked into jail. It is only those who cannot make the bond 
who receive a hearing before a judicial officer. See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 
1252–53 (11th Cir. 2018) (describing a system of this kind). In counties that use such systems, 
our inquiry focused on the hearing process for those who had not made the initial, pre-set 
bond. 
 110  The authors identified four counties where financial affidavits were in use, and they 
were not uniform. For examples, see infra Part XI.  
 111  This appears to be the case in three counties studied. 
 112  A handful of counties came close but were missing one component of the required 
financial inquiry. Three of the counties studied evaluate income/assets and dependents but 
not debts. Another county inquires into income, dependents, and disability but not 
debts/obligations. 
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density counties in the study sample. The other seven were among 
the higher density counties. There does not, therefore, appear to be 
a correlation with the more rural counties struggling to provide 
hearings in a timely manner, as twelve of them met the forty-eight-
hour mark, some providing hearings no longer than twenty-four 
hours after arrest. Many counties113 studied adhere to the initial 
appearance hearing requirements for probable cause 
determinations prescribed under state law: that those arrested 
without a warrant appear within forty-eight hours and those 
arrested on a warrant appear within seventy-two hours of arrest.114 
However, as a matter of federal due process, it is questionable 
whether a period of seventy-two hours of incarceration on 
unaffordable bail would pass muster: Walker II held only that a 
ceiling of forty-eight hours of such incarceration was presumptively 
constitutional. 
 
3. Research Question Three: Does the Jurisdiction “Guarantee 
Release” Within Forty-Eight Hours of Arrest? 
Based on the study, only four counties’ practices suggest that 
release is “guaranteed” for misdemeanor arrestees who cannot pay 
bail within forty-eight hours of their arrest. This constitutes 8.16% 
of the counties for which research question three could be answered.  
A handful of other counties115 appeared to guarantee release for 
most, if not all, defendants, but practical constraints meant that the 
release did not always occur within forty-eight hours. For example, 
one county observed ensures that virtually all misdemeanor 
arrestees are released after their first appearance, but when 
interviewed, the judges indicated there may be rare circumstances 
in which a misdemeanor arrestee’s bond remains in an amount he 
or she cannot afford due to public safety concerns. Further, that 
same jurisdiction does not hold hearings on weekends, so even with 
its general practice of lowering bail or ordering recognizance release 
 
 113  Representatives from seven counties explicitly indicated that they adhered to the 
seventy-two-hour rule, and it is likely that many others do as well. 
 114  See O.C.G.A. § 17-4-62 (2020). 
 115  Two more counties indicated that they provide a guarantee of release within forty-eight 
hours for traffic charges: any arrestee still in custody on a pending traffic citation forty-eight 
hours after arrest is automatically released on a recognizance bond. Four additional 
interviewees indicated that judges in their county had a positive attitude towards working 
with individuals who cannot afford their bond to get them out, but it was difficult to tell on 
what timeframe this happened and whether that process only began after securing counsel.  
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at bail hearings, an arrestee is not guaranteed freedom within 
forty-eight hours due to the hearing schedule. Similarly, practices 
observed in another jurisdiction came close to a guarantee of release 
within forty-eight hours, because most misdemeanor arrestees are 
released on their own recognizance, but initial appearances are 
scheduled within seventy-two hours of arrests on a warrant, thus 
falling short of the forty-eight-hour mark. A third county provides 
hearings on Fridays to reduce bond and evaluate conditions of 
release for anyone who has not been able to afford their bond; if 
these hearings were held within forty-eight hours of each 
individual’s arrest rather than weekly, the guarantee could likely 
be shown.  
The counties that ensure release within forty-eight hours or come 
close were the exception rather than the rule. Numerous counties 
indicated that they do not provide hearings to evaluate bail, leaving 
arrestees to navigate their initial bail requirement without judicial 
process. Others do so irregularly, or only every few weeks. Even 
counties that provide regular post-arrest hearings to consider bail 
do not consistently operate with a guarantee of release for those 
unable to pay their misdemeanor bonds—either because the court 
does not inquire into finances, or because the court imposes or 
maintains unaffordable financial conditions regardless of an 
inquiry.116  
 
4. Research Question Four: Does the Jurisdiction Provide Counsel 
to Assist with a Bail Evaluation when an Arrestee First Appears in 
Court After Arrest? 
Of the forty-two counties for which this question could be 
answered, only five (11.9%) provided appointed counsel at initial 
hearings to evaluate or reevaluate misdemeanor bail. Of these five, 
only two had a population density of under 288 people per square 
mile: the other three were more populous.117 While a handful of 
other counties indicated that arrested persons often apply for 
 
 116  Unaffordable bail is set routinely across the state and was directly observed or 
documented in seventeen counties studied. Based on the limited process available, the 
authors suspect unaffordable bail is also commonly imposed in at least seven more 
identifiable counties. 
 117  This is consistent with other observations about the availability of legal resources in 
more rural jurisdictions. See generally Lisa R. Pruitt et al., Legal Deserts: A Multi-State 
Perspective on Rural Access to Justice, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2018) (providing similar 
observations about the availability of legal resources in rural jurisdictions).  
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appointed or public defense counsel, and later seek bond reductions 
through counsel, this does not mirror the speed (forty-eight hours) 
or coverage (representation for all incarcerated at the time of initial 
bail hearings) endorsed by Walker.  
 
5. Trends from Publicly Available Jail Data. 
Jail data confirm the sobering overall results of the 
court-watching and interview survey. We report the results of the 
jail-data analysis briefly here.118 
Among the eighteen counties for which we tracked jail-inmate 
registries from May to November 2019,119 36.72% of those arrested 
on new misdemeanor charges only, with no other holds, spent three 
days or more days in jail. The average jail time was 8.7 days. The 
rate of detention for three days or more ranged from a low of 11% in 
one county to 80% in another. In fourteen counties, at least 20% of 
those arrested on new misdemeanor charges without other holds 
spent at least three days in jail. These figures indicate that many 
people are incarcerated for longer than forty-eight hours after arrest 
on misdemeanor charges in Georgia.  
It is also notable, however, that the median jail time in these 
eighteen counties was two days. This is likely due to another subset 
of the population being able to afford bail quickly and securing 
release within the first few hours of arrest. Although a shorter 
median detention period is a good thing, it highlights the disparity 
that a money-bail system produces between those who are able to 
immediately secure release and those who are not. 
DeKalb County’s jail records also reveal alarming rates of 
detention for more than three days. From 2000 through 2019, more 
than half of the 212,091 people booked on new misdemeanor charges 
without other holds—112,340 individuals, or 53%—spent three 
days or more in jail. The average jail stay for this group was 11.23 
days. The median jail stay, on the other hand, was 3.16 days. 
Further, it was possible to evaluate DeKalb arrestees based on the 
group of people who bonded out with a cash bond or commercial 
bondsman. These jail stays were much shorter than the population 
at large: those who bonded out were jailed a median of thirty-six 
hours (less than half the median for the entire population). This 
suggests, perhaps intuitively, that those with the resources to pay 
 
 118  Appendices C and D provide additional detail. See infra Parts IX–X. 
 119  This dataset includes 2,750 individual cases. 
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bail or hire a bondsman secure their release much faster than those 
who cannot.  
The good news is that the percentage of people jailed for more 
than three days after misdemeanor arrest in DeKalb County seems 
to be on the decline. In 2009, 63.11% were incarcerated for three 
days or more, in 2015 the figure dropped to 39.75%, and in 2019 the 
figure was 26.5%. While a quarter of people charged solely with new 
misdemeanors is still a high proportion to be incarcerated for three 
or more days, DeKalb County appears to be making substantial 
progress.120 
 
 Figure 1: DeKalb Misdemeanor Arrestees Held in Jail 3 Days or 
More. 
 
 
 
Using the Monthly Jail Reports published by the Georgia 
Department of Community Affairs,121 we also calculated the 
average pretrial detention rate per capita for each Georgia county 
during 2019 (including those detained on felony as well as 
misdemeanor charges). We report this rate as the number of pretrial 
 
 120  Although it is tangential to our study, we also note that between 2000 and 2019, 80.27% 
of misdemeanor arrestees in the DeKalb jail were Black, whereas only 54.17% of the county’s 
population identified as Black on the 2010 Census.  
 121  Monthly Jail Reports, GA. DEP’T COMMUNITY AFF., https://www.dca.ga.gov/local-
government-assistance/research-surveys/monthly-jail-reports (last visited Apr. 17, 2020). 
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defendants in jail for every thousand county residents, on average, 
on any given day of the year. The number ranged from zero to near 
seven. Figure 2 illustrates the range, with darker fill corresponding 
to a higher pretrial detention rate and the rates rounded to the 
nearest integer. We note that the counties with the highest pretrial 
detention rates include higher-density counties, like Chatham 
County, as well as lower-density counties like Ware County. 
Appendix D provides more detail.  
 
 Figure 2: Average Per Capita Pretrial Detention Rate by County, 
2019. 
 
C. LIMITATIONS 
Our qualitative study has many limitations. Most significantly, 
we were only able to observe bail hearings in thirteen of the fifty-five 
counties we identified for study. It generally proved easier to 
court-watch in more populous counties; only three of the thirteen 
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counties in which court-watching was achieved were in the 
less-dense half of the total sample. Further, due to the size of our 
study sample, scheduling, and the geographic spread of counties 
studied, in most instances the information gleaned by the research 
volunteers was limited to the information available on the given day 
or days of contact. For example, students who conducted interviews 
over the phone—despite best efforts to reach someone with 
firsthand knowledge—were limited by who happened to take their 
call and by that person’s degree of familiarity with misdemeanor 
pretrial practice. In other jurisdictions, students were 
accommodated to observe court—including in places where court 
proceedings are not otherwise open to the public—but their 
presence as observers may have had an interactive effect with the 
manner in which the hearing was run. Finally, and significantly, 
while the authors made every effort to train volunteers, follow up 
with questions, and use consistent materials to track information, 
this study was limited by the ability of a decentralized group of 
volunteers to frame our questions about misdemeanor post-arrest 
practice to local officials from across the state, who may use a 
variety of terms for the procedures we sought to understand, or not 
have any procedures at all.  
Notwithstanding the use of multiple research methods, however, 
we believe the results convey important and reliable information, 
especially in the aggregate. We found that the overall results for 
each metric studied did not vary widely depending on the research 
method deployed.122 Nor did we encounter inconsistent information 
from court-watching versus phone interviews in any county. 
The jail-data analysis is also subject to serious limitations. To 
start, the jail-inmate registries we tracked were non-random, 
although they did represent a geographically diverse subset of 
Georgia counties. Counties were selected for convenience in order to 
maximize our data within the study’s time constraints. As a 
consequence, a disproportionate number of the counties whose jail 
registries we tracked were rural. We cannot vouch for the accuracy 
of the data published on the jail registry sites.123 The effort to 
 
 122 For instance, regardless of the methodology employed in a county, the trend held that 
0–15% of counties studied “guaranteed release” within forty-eight hours. See infra Part VIII. 
 123  Mistakes in data input for several of the jail websites was identified in various records. 
These mistakes resulted in observations that were not always accurate. Day-by-day analyses 
of the data detected edits made by jail staff to correct some mistakes, providing support that 
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restrict the data to records of those arrested on new misdemeanor 
charges alone, and not subject to other holds, may also have 
introduced unintended distortions into the data, although we tried 
to accomplish this process as carefully as possible. Our analysis of 
the jail data published by the Department of Community Affairs, 
finally, is subject to limitations discussed further in Appendix D. 
We readily acknowledge these limitations and offer our results 
as a provisional picture of misdemeanor bail practice in Georgia 
rather than a conclusive audit. Both the authors and the Georgia 
Law Review welcome additional information or notice of error. 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. UNIVERSALIZE ADHERENCE TO THE LAW 
The chief finding from this research is that most counties will 
need to adapt their misdemeanor post-arrest practices to comply 
with state and federal law. This will require commitment from both 
state and local actors.  
 
1. Recommendations for Local Officials. 
County and municipal officials charged with administering 
misdemeanor post-arrest process could make a handful of 
improvements to actualize the legal principles from Walker124 and 
the amended Georgia Code.  
First, court officials should consider adopting financial affidavits 
like the one in use in Glynn County,125 or undertake the same 
detailed financial inquiry during first appearances in court. The 
ultimate question should be what amount an individual can 
immediately afford to pay,126 considering not only her income but 
also fixed expenses and other debts. Implementation of more 
 
these records were at least being regularly verified, while other mistakes were interpretable, 
such as misspellings of prisoners’ offenses. 
 124  Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018) (dealing with post-arrest 
procedures and the impact of bail requirements on low-income individuals). 
 125  See infra Part XI. 
 126  The authors do not recommend that courts should factor in the possible use of a 
commercial bondsman; instead they should consider the total bond amount as though the 
individual was posting it. This is because, due to the wide discretion they are afforded, there 
is no guarantee that a bondsman will post bail in any given case and because the individual 
may not be in a position to surrender a non-refundable deposit to a commercial bail agent but 
would post an affordable bail amount and return to court to get it back. 
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standardized forms and procedures would reduce judicial discretion 
in making ability-to-pay determinations, which can lead to 
inaccuracies and inconsistency.127  
Second, jailers and sheriff’s department employees should keep 
a close eye on the population in their jails who are detained because 
of a bail requirement and set a hearing before a judge for anyone 
approaching the forty-eight-hour mark. “Jail call” hearings 
provided in Clarke County—through which those who remain 
incarcerated are brought before a judge to configure release 
conditions—provide a good example of a possible safeguard, though 
counties should hold such hearings frequently enough to ensure 
that wealth-based incarceration does not exceed the presumptively 
constitutional forty-eight-hour mark.  
Third, local law enforcement agencies may reduce the overall 
burden on their systems while promoting compliance with state and 
federal law by adopting the legislative recommendation to issue 
citations and summonses rather than booking individuals suspected 
of misdemeanors into jail.128  
Finally, court officials and jailers could adopt a policy, like that 
employed with respect to traffic tickets in Gilmer and Gwinnett 
counties, that anyone incarcerated for forty-eight hours on a 
misdemeanor bond they cannot pay is automatically released on a 
recognizance or unsecured bond. As noted by the Eleventh Circuit’s 
predecessor court, “[s]ystems which incorporate a presumption 
favoring personal recognizance avoid much of the difficulty inherent 
in the entire subject area.”129 Such a policy spares the local 
administrative burden of holding hearings frequently enough to 
ensure the forty-eight-hour mark is not exceeded. Further, recent 
empirical evidence suggests that unsecured bonds130 or release with 
 
 127  See Meghan M. O’Neil & J.J. Prescott, Targeting Poverty in the Courts: Improving the 
Measurement of Ability to Pay, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 205–06 (2019) (describing 
how ability-to-pay determinations are often ad hoc and often vary among judges, who may 
not have the training or expertise to conduct such evaluations). 
 128  S.B. 407, 154th General Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ga. 2018); see also O.C.G.A. § 17-4-23(a)(2) 
(2018) (establishing procedure for handling misdemeanor traffic violations). 
 129  Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 130  See, e.g., BRICE COOK ET AL., USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE OUTCOMES (Jan. 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/crim-just-report.pdf; MICHAEL R. JONES, UNSECURED BONDS: THE 
AS EFFECTIVE AND MOST EFFICIENT PRETRIAL RELEASE OPTION (Oct. 2013), 
https://cutt.ly/Se3WGqK (controlling for risk level and finding that persons released on 
 2020]   BOOTS AND BAIL ON THE GROUND 1265 
 
court date reminders131 adequately promote court appearance and 
public safety.132  
 
2. Recommendations for State Officials. 
Misdemeanor bail reform was recently a statewide priority with 
a number of high-profile champions in Georgia.133 The results of this 
study suggest that further attention to implementation on the part 
of influential state actors would be beneficial. State officials should 
consider a combination of oversight, funding, and public education 
in order to realize the legislative change enacted and to reduce local 
jurisdictions’ vulnerability to additional legal challenges. 
Members of the statewide Judicial Qualifications Commission 
may wish to consider undertaking their own court observations to 
determine whether local judges are following Rules 1.1 (Complying 
With the Law), 1.2 (Promoting Public Confidence in the Judiciary), 
and 2.6 (Ensuring the Right to Be Heard) of the Georgia Code of 
Judicial Conduct.134 Members of the State Supreme Court could 
exercise a leadership role by stressing a culture of pretrial release 
with their judicial colleagues, including supporting judges against 
political backlash after they make decisions that promote release.135 
Such institutional leadership was critical to a cultural change in 
 
unsecured bonds performed as well as those released on secured bonds in terms of court 
appearance rates). 
 131  See NAT’L INST. CORR., A FRAMEWORK FOR PRETRIAL JUSTICE 47 (Feb. 2017), 
https://cutt.ly/ke6QJzk (noting court date reminders are “highly effective” and citing reports 
from eight jurisdictions about adopting the practice). 
 132  JONES, supra note 130, at 3 (identifying court appearance and public safety as important 
objectives for pretrial release policies). 
 133  See Cook, supra note 6 (describing bail reform efforts by Atlanta Mayor Keisha Lance 
Bottoms); Maya T. Prabhu, Georgia Governor Signs Bail Overhaul into Law, ATLANTA J. 
CONST. (May 7, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/georgia-
governor-signs-bail-overhaul-into-law/QxiIFhCmAyLHz2NoSyO3dI/ (describing Georgia 
Governor Nathan Deal’s bail reform efforts). 
 134  GEORGIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2016). 
 135  For an insightful reflection, see Ronald Kessler, I Set a Defendant Free and Got Blamed 
When He Raped Someone, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 31, 2017, 10:00 PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/08/31/i-set-a-defendant-free-and-got-blamed-
when-he-raped-someone.  
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New Jersey,136 where courts have been faithfully following new 
pretrial procedures.137 
Further, executive and legislative officials should prioritize 
funding for the supports needed to ensure that local practices 
comply with legal requirements. This is of particular importance in 
areas like public defense, where counties bear a significant share of 
the financial burden, and many rural counties simply do not have 
the resources to meet their legal burdens. This includes allocating 
funding for pretrial services, especially court reminders, to facilitate 
successful pretrial release. Adequately funded public defense 
counsel is critical to the success of any reforms, as public defenders 
are the first resource for arrested persons otherwise harmed by 
wealth-based detention.  
Additionally, state legislators and the Attorney General likely 
need to eliminate barriers to the local use of citation and/or 
summons practices. For example, O.C.G.A. § 17-4-23(a)(2) requires 
fingerprinting pursuant to arrest at the specification of the Attorney 
General. Other local law enforcement agencies may be required to 
conduct a more expansive collection of identifying information in 
order to receive state or federal grants.138 If local law enforcement 
officials believe they are required to arrest and book all individuals 
charged with misdemeanors in order to comply with other data 
collection requirements, it will seriously impede their ability to 
undertake citations practices that would enable many individuals 
to avoid jail altogether.139 
Finally, those who contributed to the successful passage of SB 
407 may consider renewed attention to the issue in light of its 
limited implementation. Continued public education and 
conversation through Georgia’s judicial councils,140 other 
 
 136  See New Jersey Reform Leader Says Better Data Strengthened Bail System, PEW 
CHARITABLE TR. (May 1, 2019), https://cutt.ly/2rHNWwF (discussing, inter alia, the 
importance of judicial culture change to ensuring the success of reforms). 
 137  See generally N.J. CTS., 2018 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE (2019), 
https://cutt.ly/LrHNIz4 (detailing the fact that New Jersey’s criminal justice reforms, 
particularly a new approach to pretrial release, are working as intended).  
 138  See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Grant Will Provide Law 
Enforcement Assistance in Savannah (Sept. 10, 2019), https://cutt.ly/8rHXwCs 
(contemplating grant to provide local law enforcement with, inter alia, fingerprint scanners). 
 139  The state task force identified that this issue “likely eliminates any incentives for law 
enforcement to utilize citations.” See AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 40, at 28. 
 140  Examples include the Council of Magistrate Judges, the Council of Municipal Court 
Judges, and the Council of State Court Judges.  
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professional councils,141 and amongst elected officials would be 
helpful. Journalism documenting local practices and the harms 
caused by more than two days of wealth-based detention could 
contribute to public education and continued progress. Similarly, 
civil rights advocates, activists, and others interested in this issue 
may wish to renew their focus on pretrial justice in Georgia—
including in counties beyond the metropolitan Atlanta area—in 
light of these initial findings. 
B. FURTHER REFORMS TO CONSIDER 
The focus of this study was on compliance with existing law. 
There will remain, however, considerable room for improvement in 
Georgia after practices adhere more closely to the legislative and 
judicial guidance of the past few years. First, a number of 
recommendations of the state task force—including explicitly 
providing local courts with the authority to designate bail schedule 
amounts as unsecured, or permitting automatic release on 
non-monetary bail for individuals whose charges do not authorize a 
sentence of jail—were not adopted into law.142 Also, notably, few of 
the protections outlined in this paper explicitly reach those accused 
of felonies.143 A considerable number of individuals in Georgia are 
arrested and detained while presumed innocent on felony charges. 
These individuals are protected by the same federal constitutional 
principles outlined in Walker II and other federal court decisions 
across the country, and serious discussion about the overbroad use 
of pretrial detention in felony cases is due in Georgia.  
 
 141  Examples include the Council of Magistrate Court Clerks, the Association County 
Commissioners of Georgia, and the Constitutional Officers Association of Georgia. 
 142  AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 40, at 30–31. 
 143  The plain text of O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e)(2) does not limit the financial inquiry or “as soon 
as possible” bail determination language to misdemeanors. Only persons charged with 
misdemeanors, however, have an affirmative statutory right to bail. O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(b)(1) 
(2018). 
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Given the criminogenic effect of incarceration in a jail,144 state 
and local lawmakers may wish to create categories of charges145 for 
which citation or immediate post-booking release is mandatory, not 
simply discretionary. Such a practice would promote system 
efficiency and uniformity while avoiding constitutional infirmity. 
Further, local lawmakers should examine the anchoring effect of 
preset bail schedules in normalizing or extending wealth-based 
pretrial detention and consider either eliminating schedules or 
modifying them to prescribe unsecured rather than upfront 
requirements of bail, unless a law enforcement officer or 
prosecuting attorney files for an individualized consideration of 
more restrictive conditions than an unsecured bond.146 
This study was undertaken before the novel coronavirus, leading 
to an easily-transmittable and serious disease known as COVID-19, 
swept the nation and globe.147 Public health experts agree148 that 
 
 144  Social scientists link poverty, lack of economic opportunity, shame and isolation, and 
exposure to violence to violent conduct. See, e.g., JAMES GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE: OUR DEADLY 
EPIDEMIC AND ITS CAUSES 103–04, 191 (1996); Patterns of Violence in American Society, in 1 
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 70 (Albert Reiss & Jeffrey Roth eds., 1993); 
Cleopatra H. Caldwell et al., Racial Discrimination and Racial Identity as Risk or Protective 
Factors for Violent Behaviors in African American Young Adults, 33 AM. J. COMMUNITY 
PSYCHOL. 91 (2004); Bruce P. Kennedy et al., Social Capital, Income Inequality, and Firearm 
Violent Crime, 47 SOC. SCI. & MED. 7 (1998); Li-yu Song et al., Violence Exposure and 
Emotional Trauma as Contributors to Adolescents’ Violent Behaviors, 152 ARCHIVES 
PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 531 (1998). Jails expose individuals to, or at least contribute 
to, virtually all of these conditions. See generally DANIELLE SERED, VERA INST. FOR JUSTICE, 
ACCOUNTING FOR VIOLENCE: HOW TO INCREASE SAFETY AND BREAK OUR FAILED RELIANCE ON 
MASS INCARCERATION (2017), https://cutt.ly/ErHCYNc. 
 145  State law would only prohibit inclusion of the serious charges listed in O.C.G.A. 
§ 17-6-1(a) on this list: other less serious felonies and all non-family violence misdemeanors 
could receive this treatment. 
 146  A federal district court in the Eleventh Circuit structured an injunction to operate in 
this manner. Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, Schultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (No. 5:17-cv-00270-MHH), 
2018 WL 9908709. 
 147  Robert Verity et al., Estimates of the Severity of Coronavirus Disease 2019: A 
Model-Based Analysis, LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Mar. 30, 2020, at 6; Derek Hawkins et 
al., Trump Declares Coronavirus Outbreak a National Emergency, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 
2020, 10:46 PM), https://cutt.ly/ftWyIPb. 
 148  See, e.g., Declaration of Dr. Jaimie Meyer at ¶¶ 37–38, ECF No. 42, Velesaca v. Decker, 
1:20-cv-01803-AKH (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2020) (noting that population reduction in jails will 
be “crucially important to reducing the level of risk both for those within [jail] facilities and 
for the community at large,” and that stemming the flow of intakes is a part of the necessary 
intervention); Declaration of Robert B. Greifinger, MD at ¶ 13, ECF No. 4, Dawson v. Asher, 
2:20-cv-00409-JLR-MAT (W.D. Wash. Mar. 16, 2020) (“In my opinion, the public health 
recommendation is to release high-risk people from detention, given the heightened risks to 
their health and safety, especially given the lack of a viable vaccine for prevention or effective 
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widespread release of persons in jails—particularly those in pretrial 
custody—is a necessary intervention to slow the spread of this 
serious disease, both in custody and in the greater community: jail 
environments resemble other congregate environments like cruise 
ships149 and nursing homes.150 This provides a separate, and 
ever-more urgent, basis for Georgia counties to evaluate pretrial 
release practices to ensure the greater public health. Lessons may 
be learned from these exigent circumstances that help facilitate 
even narrower uses of pretrial detention in the future. 
Lastly, it bears recognizing that Georgia leads the nation in its 
rate of placing people on probation, at 5,143 people on probation per 
100,000 people.151 The second highest rate of probation is in 
Pennsylvania at 2,968 per 100,000 people. Nearly half a million 
people are on probation in Georgia.152 An underexplored area of 
reform, then, is the incarceration of individuals for technical 
violations of probation, or who are arrested on a low-level charge 
and otherwise eligible for pretrial release but for a probation hold.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although Georgia has made hard-earned progress in 
misdemeanor bail reform, this study suggests that the work of 
advancing justice in Georgia’s pretrial system is far from over. After 
the initial fanfare of a bill enactment and judicial ruling, it is 
natural for energy and attention to shift to the next project. But the 
 
treatment at this stage.”); Declaration of Dr. Marc Stern at ¶¶ 9–10, ECF No. 6, Dawson, 
2:20-cv-00409-JLR-MAT (noting that release is “a critically important way to meaningfully 
mitigate” the risks of harm to persons who are at high risk of serious illness or death, as well 
as to support the broader community health infrastructure). 
 149  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is currently recommending that 
travelers defer cruise ship travel worldwide. COVID-19 and Cruise Ship Travel, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://cutt.ly/7tEEQvT (last updated Mar. 17, 2020) 
(“Cruise ship passengers are at increased risk of person-to-person spread of infectious 
diseases, including COVID-19.”). 
 150  The CDC notes that long-term care facilities and nursing homes pose a particular risk 
because of “their congregate nature” and the residents served. See Nursing Homes & 
Long-Term Care Facilities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://cutt.ly/7tEEITH (last updated Apr. 15, 2020). 
 151  Alexi Jones, Correctional Control 2018: Incarceration and Supervision by State, PRISON 
POL’Y INST. (Dec. 2019), https://cutt.ly/ErHNZyy (“Georgia is punitive from any angle, as the 
only state that is both a top jailer and leader in probation.”). 
 152  Carrie Teegardin, Georgia Leads Nation in Probation, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Nov. 19, 
2015), https://cutt.ly/2rHN4Jw. 
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needless and harmful jailing of Georgians due to their inability to 
pay bail persists across the state.  
In light of these findings, local officials may wish to make 
improvements such as: (1) expanding the use of citations and other 
mandatory release procedures, (2) expediting post-arrest hearings 
and release, (3) increasing the quality and accuracy of ability-to-pay 
hearings, and (4) implementing safeguards such as jail-review 
hearings or other automatic methods by which those who remain in 
jail due to inability to pay are identified and released within 
forty-eight hours of arrest. We encourage state officials to: 
(1) increase oversight of local court practices, (2) provide political 
leadership and continued education on recent reforms, (3) increase 
resources for public defense and pretrial supports, and (4) remove 
barriers to the use of citations and other automatic post-charging 
release practices, particularly mandatory fingerprinting.  
Ultimately, however, a wide range of stakeholders—law 
enforcement, judges, lawmakers, other elected officials, activists, 
and attorneys—must make a concerted effort in order to create a 
culture in which “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or 
without trial . . . the carefully limited exception.”153 Georgia would 
be well served by ensuring that progress toward this goal is not 
undermined by a lack of implementation on the ground and by 
taking the additional steps needed to actualize this tenet of our 
democracy. 
  
 
 153  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
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VII. APPENDIX A: COUNTIES RANDOMLY SELECTED FOR STUDY154 
First District  
Atlantic, Brunswick, Eastern, Ogeechee, and Waycross Circuits—
median population density: 50.5 
Lower than median density counties 
County Population Density 
Charlton 12,171 15.7 
Jenkins 8,340 24.0 
Wayne 30,099 46.9 
Higher than median density counties 
Liberty 63,453 129.5 
Glynn 79,625 189.7 
Chatham 265,128 621.7 
 
Second District  
Alapaha, Dougherty, Pataula, Southern, South Georgia, and 
Tifton Circuits—median population density: 32.9 
Lower than median density counties 
County Population Density 
Clay 3,183 16.3 
Randolph 7,719 18.0 
Terrell 9,315 27.8 
Higher than median density counties 
Worth 21,679 38.0 
Thomas 44,720 82.1 
Tift 40,118 154.9 
 
Third District  
Chattahoochee, Houston, Macon, and Southwestern Circuits—
median population density: 42.1 
Lower than median density counties 
County Population Density 
Webster 2,799 13.4 
Talbot 6,865 17.5 
 
 154  Each county’s total population and population density number is from the 2010 Census. 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEORGIA: 2010 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING 9–11 (Aug. 
2010), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2010/cph-2/cph-2-12.pdf. 
“Density” refers to inhabitants per square mile. 
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Taylor 8,906 23.6 
Higher than median density counties 
Harris 32,024 69.0 
Bibb 155,547 622.8 
Muscogee 189,885 877.5 
 
Fourth District  
Stone Mountain and Rockdale Circuits 
Counties (total, both selected) 
County Population Density 
DeKalb 691,893 2,585.7 
Rockdale 85,215 656.5 
 
Fifth District  
Atlanta Circuit 
Counties (one selected) 
County Population Density 
Fulton 920,581 1,748.0 
 
Sixth District  
Clayton, Coweta, Flint, Griffin, and Towaliga Circuits—median 
population density: 145.1 
Lower than median density counties 
County Population Density 
Heard 11,834 40.0 
Meriwether 21,992 43.9 
Lamar 18,317 99.8 
Higher than median density counties 
Coweta 21,679 38.0 
Fayette 106,567 548.3155 
Clayton 259,424 1,832.5 
 
Seventh District  
Cherokee, Cobb, Conasauga, Douglas, Lookout Mountain, 
Paulding, Rome, and Tallapoosa Circuits—median population 
density: 172 
Lower than median density counties 
 
 155  Fayette County was randomly replaced by Carroll County on November 7, 2019. 
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County Population Density 
Dade 16,633 95.6 
Haralson 28,780 102.0 
Polk 41,475 133.6 
Higher than median density counties 
Paulding 142,324 455.8 
Douglas 132,403 661.8 
Cobb 688,078 2,026.4 
 
Eighth District  
Cordele, Dublin, Middle, Ocmulgee, and Oconee Circuits—
median population density: 38.1 
Lower than median density counties 
County Population Density 
Wilcox 9,255 24.5 
Treutlen 6,885 34.5 
Montgomery 9,123 38.1156 
Higher than median density counties 
Pulaski 12,010 48.2 
Putnam 21,218 61.6 
Ben Hill 17,634 70.5 
 
Ninth District  
Appalachian, Blue Ridge, Bell-Forsyth, Enotah, Gwinnett, 
Mountain, and Northeastern Circuits—median population 
density: 112.8 
Lower than median density counties 
County Population Density 
Rabun 16,276 44.0 
Fannin 23,682 61.2 
Gilmer 28,292 66.3 
Higher than median density counties 
Pickens 29,431 126.8 
Habersham 43,041 155.5 
Gwinnett 805,321 1,871.2 
 
 156  The Eighth Circuit had two counties with a population density of 38.1 people per square 
mile: (1) Montgomery County and (2) Dooly County. Dooly County was the “median” by 
density when the counties were listed in order by population density, so Montgomery County 
was not disqualified from the randomizer. 
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Tenth District  
Alcovy, Augusta, Northern, Piedmont, Toombs, and Western 
Circuits—median population density: 85.0 
Lower than median density counties 
County Population Density 
Taliaferro 1,717 8.8 
Elbert  20,166 57.4 
Banks 18,395 79.3 
Higher than median density counties 
Oconee 32,808 178.0 
Richmond 200,549 618.4 
Clarke 116,714 979.1 
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VIII. APPENDIX B: RESEARCH FINDINGS  
Table 1: Findings from Court Observations 
Initial 
Bail 
Hearing 
Within 
48 
Hours? 
Counsel at 
Initial Bail 
Hearing? 
ATP 
Considered 
at Bail 
Hearing 
If ATP, How? Release 
Guarant
eed 
Within 
48 Hours 
if Unable 
to Pay 
Initial 
Bail? 
No No No  No 
No Yes Yes Judge asks about 
income and ability to 
pay amt. in bond 
No 
Yes No Yes Unknown No 
Yes No Yes Financial affidavit 
(does not include 
liabilities); Judge 
inquires if able to 
afford a bond (not 
specific amounts); 
Judge asks about 
income, assets, debt, 
and dependents 
No 
No Yes Yes Unclear: no financial 
affidavit discussed, but 
finances seemed to be 
considered per court 
watchers 
No 
Yes No Yes Financial affidavit 
(available in 
appendix), Judge did 
not inquire at hearing 
Yes 
Yes No No  Yes 
No Yes No  No 
No No Yes Financial affidavit No 
Yes No Yes Informal; Judge and 
sheriff are familiar 
with inidivdual’s 
circumstances because 
it is a small 
community 
No 
No No No  No 
No No Sometimes Judge asks accused 
about income 
(sometimes), assets 
No 
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(sometimes), 
dependents 
(sometimes), and what 
amount the person 
could pay (sometimes) 
No No Yes Judge asked accused 
about income and 
dependents 
No 
Total Yes and % Yes (rounded to nearest hundredth) 
5 3 8  2 
38.46% 23.08% 61.54%  15.38% 
 
Table 2: Findings from Calls with Clerks 
Initial Bail 
Hearing 
Always 
Within 48 
Hours? 
Counsel at 
Initial Bail 
Hearing? 
ATP 
Considered at 
Bail Hearing? 
If ATP, How? Release 
Guarantee
d Within 
48 Hours if 
Unable to 
Pay Initial 
Bail? 
No Unknown Unknown  No 
No Unknown Unknown  No 
No Unknown Unknown  No 
No Unknown Unknown  No 
No Unknown Unknown  No 
No Unknown Unknown  No 
No No Unknown  No 
No Unknown Sometimes Unknown No 
Yes No No  No 
Total Yes and % Yes (rounded to nearest hundreth) 
2 0 1  0 
20% 0% 10%  0% 
 
Table 3: Findings from Public Defender Interviews 
Initial 
Bail 
Hearing 
Within 
48 
Hours? 
Counsel at 
Initial Bail 
Hearing? 
ATP Considered 
at Bail Hearing 
If ATP, How? Release 
Guaranteed 
Within 48 
Hours if 
Unable to 
Pay Initial 
Bail? 
Yes No No  No 
Yes No Yes Unknown No 
No No No  No 
No Yes Yes Informal; 
Judge and 
sheriff are 
familiar with 
No 
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inidivdual's 
circumstances 
because it is a 
small 
community 
No No No Eventually, 
bond reduction 
hearing or 
sheriff recog 
release if 
someone in 
because can't 
pay 
No 
Total Yes and % Yes (rounded to nearest hundredth) 
2 1 2  0 
40% 20% 40%  0% 
 
Table 4: Findings from Judge Interviews157 
Initial 
Bail 
Hearing 
Within 
48 
Hours? 
Counsel at 
Initial Bail 
Hearing? 
ATP Considered 
at Bail Hearing 
If ATP, How? Release 
Guaranteed 
Within 48 
Hours if 
Unable to 
Pay Initial 
Bail? 
No No No  No 
Yes No No  No 
Yes No No  No 
Yes No No  No 
No 
Yes Yes 
Judge asks 
about income 
and ability to 
pay amount in 
bond 
No 
Yes No No  No 
Yes No Yes Unknown No 
Yes 
No Yes 
Financial 
affidavit (does 
not include 
liabilities), 
Judge inquires 
if able to afford 
a bond (not 
specific 
amounts), 
Judge asks 
No 
 
 157  The last five interviews were conducted with magistrate judges. 
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about income, 
assets, debt, 
and 
dependents 
No 
Yes Yes 
Unclear: no 
financial 
affidavit 
discussed, but 
finances 
seemed to be 
considered per 
court watchers 
No 
Yes No No  Yes 
No No No  No 
No 
No Yes 
Financial 
affidavit 
No 
Yes No Unknown  Yes 
Unclear 
No Yes 
Judge asks 
questions, no 
affidavit. 
Unclear how 
detailed. 
No 
No Unknown No  No 
No No No  No 
Yes No Yes  No 
Yes No No  No 
Yes Yes Yes Questions No 
Yes 
No Yes 
Judge asks 
questions. 
Yes 
Yes 
No Yes 
Judge asks 
questions. 
Yes 
Total Yes and % Yes (rounded to nearest hundreth) 
13 3 10  4 
62% 14.29% 47.62%  19.05% 
 
Table 5: Findings from Jail and Sheriff Interviews158 
Initial 
Bail 
Hearing 
Within 
48 
Hours? 
Counsel at 
Initial Bail 
Hearing? 
ATP Considered 
at Bail Hearing 
If ATP, How? Release 
Guaranteed 
Within 48 
Hours if 
Unable to 
Pay Initial 
Bail? 
No No No  No 
 
 158  The first three interviews were conducted with jail staff, and the remaining interviews 
were conducted with sheriffs. 
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No Yes Yes 
Informal; 
Judge and 
sheriff are 
familiar with 
individual’s 
circumstances 
because it is a 
small 
community No 
No No Unknown  No 
No Yes Yes  No 
No No No  No 
Yes No Unknown  No 
No No No  No 
Yes No Yes 
Informal; 
Judge and 
sheriff are 
familiar with 
individual’s 
circumstances 
because it is a 
small 
community No 
No No Unknown  No 
No No No  No 
Yes No Unknown  Unknown 
Unknown No No  No 
Total Yes and % Yes (rounded to nearest hundredth) 
3 2 3  0 
27.27% 18.18% 42.86%  0% 
 
Table 6: Findings from Clerk Interviews 
Initial 
Bail 
Hearing 
Within 
48 
Hours? 
Counsel 
at Initial 
Bail 
Hearing? 
ATP Considered 
at Bail Hearing 
If ATP, how? Release 
Guaranteed 
Within 48 
Hours if 
Unable to 
Pay Initial 
Bail? 
Yes No Yes Informally  Yes 
Yes No No  No 
No No No  No 
No No Unknown  No 
Unknown No Unknown  No 
No No Yes 
Judge asks 
questions, 
unclear how 
detailed No 
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Unknown No Yes 
Judge asks 
about 
dependents, 
judge asks 
accused about 
income, judge 
asks about 
disability No 
Total Yes and % Yes (rounded to nearest hundredth) 
2 0 3  1 
40% 0% 60%  14.29% 
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IX. APPENDIX C: JAIL DATA METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
 
County-level jail records were obtained from online Georgia 
county jail inmate registries. These registries are publicly available, 
updated daily, and published by the jails. Inmate registries contain 
information about persons held in jails, including their 
demographics, current charges, date of booking, and bond. Not 
every county reported identical variables, but they each reported on 
these categories of variables to some extent. The published records 
contained these seventeen variables: 
 
(1) Jail Id: Identifier for each inmate 
(2) SO Number: Secondary identifier for each inmate 
(3) Full Name 
(4) Address 
(5) Age and year of birth 
(6) Gender 
(7) Race 
(8) When Booked: Date and time of booking 
(9) When Released: Date and time of release 
(10) Hours Jailed: Number of hours between booking and release 
(11) Charge Count: Total number of charges 
(12) Charge Descriptions: List of charges 
(13) Felony: Presence of a felony charge 
(14) Misdemeanor: Presence of a misdemeanor charge 
(15) Charge Dispositions: Status of charges 
(16) Bond Types: Conditions for release 
(17) Bond Amount: Payment required for release, if set by judge 
 
Approximately sixty-two of the 159 counties in Georgia publish 
this information online. For this study, twenty of the sixty-two 
counties were analyzed. The twenty counties studied were not 
strategically selected, but instead chosen for their accessibility. 
Records for eighteen of these counties were collected daily from May 
through November 2019, yielding booking records for 15,369 
individuals. The twentieth county, DeKalb, provides about 
twenty-two years of records from late 1997 to present (February 
2020). Records from DeKalb County contained booking records for 
475,959 individuals. The records appear to be incomplete for years 
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before 2000 and complete in years afterward, with the exception of 
2001. 
The availability of records per-county was assessed manually 
with the help of a group of volunteer high school students who were 
members of the North Oconee High School Beta Club, directed by 
Dr. Paige Cole and Richard Rosch. These students were taught to 
differentiate between genuine and fake inmate registries, the latter 
of which were common. Each student was then given a list of 
Georgia counties and instructed to search for authentic county jail 
inmate registries, with each county jail website being checked twice 
by students and again by the project directors.  
 The authentic jail inmate registries employed a variety of 
record management systems. Most used one of eight different 
systems. For each record management system, one web scraping 
program can be written to collect data from all counties that use it. 
Such scrapers were developed and deployed in May 2019. The 
scrapers were automated to scrape each county daily, to track the 
entrance and exit of prisoners, and to track changes in each 
prisoner’s status.  
 The resulting data sets were cleaned and filtered for purposes 
of this study. Input errors made by the booking agent at the county 
jails were discovered in the data. Records with obvious entry errors 
were deleted from the data set. These were most often caused by 
incorrect booking or release dates. The data was further filtered to 
restrict the records to defendants charged only with misdemeanors. 
Individuals charged with felonies were removed from the dataset. 
Those with charge dispositions indicating that they were being held 
for a parole or probation violation, to serve a jail sentence, or in lieu 
of detention in a state or federal facility were also dropped.159 The 
final data sets contained records for a total 1,506 prisoners in 
eighteen of the counties. In DeKalb County, 153,579 of the records 
from a twenty-year range were kept. 
 
 
 
 159  Entries were dropped wherever charges included any variation of the following terms: 
“probation,” “parole,” “housed for,” “court violation,” “bond violation,” “failure to appear,” 
“marshall,” “back for,” “remain in jail,” “weekender,” “extradition,” “for court,” “fugitive,” 
“UCEA”, “foreign warrant,” “incompetent,” “USMS,” “return from,” “work release,” “court 
order”, “hold for”, “order to transport,” “bond revocation,” “violated bond,” “awaiting 
sentence,” “health evaluation,” “MHE,” “violation of family violence order,” “co hold,” “per 
judge,” “sentenced,” “bench warrant.” 
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Table 1: Date Ranges for Records Per County 
County Start date End date Bookings 
Atkinson 2019-05-24 2019-10-30 276 
Ben Hill 2019-05-24 2019-11-14 212 
Brooks 2019-09-17 2019-11-14 336 
Catoosa 2019-05-24 2019-11-16 568 
Chattooga 2019-05-24 2019-11-14 647 
Decatur 2019-05-24 2019-11-14 788 
Gilmer 2019-05-24 2019-11-24 1,539 
Gordon 2019-05-24 2019-11-14 733 
Haralson 2019-05-24 2019-11-14 1,530 
Jeff Davis 2019-05-24 2019-11-14 2,737 
Newton 2019-05-24 2019-11-14 83 
Pickens 2019-05-24 2019-11-14 428 
Pierce 2019-05-24 2019-11-14 1,242 
Tift 2019-05-24 2019-11-14 327 
Towns 2019-05-24 2019-11-14 517 
Turner 2019-05-25 2019-11-14 1,758 
Ware 2019-09-19 2019-11-29 167 
Worth 2019-09-17 2019-11-14 276 
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Table 2: DeKalb County Booking Records Per Year 
Year Bookings 
2000 23,469 
2001 11,379160 
2002 22,233 
2003 24,048 
2004 25,699 
2005 26,313 
2006 27,477 
2007 26,015 
2008 25,058 
2009 24,789 
2010 24,958 
2011 23,985 
2012 25,300 
2013 24,124 
2014 23,918 
2015 22,175 
 
 160  We do not know why the number of bookings documented in 2001 is approximately half 
that in every other year, but we suspect the anomaly is due to political turmoil surrounding 
the DeKalb County Sheriff position at that time. Former Sheriff Dorsey and his deputies 
murdered Sheriff-elect Brown on December 15, 2000. We surmise that record-keeping at the 
jail may have been neglected in the chaos that followed. See Joshua Sharpe, DeKalb Sheriffs: 
Getting in Trouble with the Law Since 1951, ATLANTA J. CONST. (June 1, 2017), 
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ajc.com/news/local/jcBkjSPxU1TuCPOrH4VevL/__;!
!Phyt6w!NHDXj3knXPWPlV1_NpIHen2wrSAuFcqS_s_hP4hoN-9MDgj3BLhkyNmAsKoo$. 
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2016 20,155 
2017 23,413 
2018 26,647 
2019 21,416 
 
Findings from our research are as follows: 
 
In eighteen counties, 1,010 of the 2,750 people arrested on new 
misdemeanor charges between May and November 2019 spent three 
days or more in jail (36.72%). 
 
Statistics from 18 counties (in days): 
• Minimum: 1 day 
• First quartile: 1 day 
• Median: 2 days 
• Third quartile: 5 days 
• Maximum: 497 days 
• Mean: 8.7 days 
• Standard deviation: 27.7 days 
 
Table 3: Misdemeanor Arrests ≥ 3 Days in Jail 
County Percentage 
Atkinson 80% 
Ware 54% 
Ben Hill 52% 
Decatur 46% 
Haralson 46% 
Catoosa 44% 
Brooks 42% 
 1286  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1235 
 
Gordon 40% 
Gilmer 39% 
Newton 34% 
Pierce 29% 
Tift 28% 
Turner 22% 
Towns 20% 
Worth 18% 
Jeff Davis 17% 
Chattooga 11% 
Pickens N/A (no misdemeanor booking) 
Overall 37% 
 
In DeKalb County, 112,340 of the 212,091 people arrested on new 
misdemeanor charges from 2000 through 2019 spent three days or 
more in jail (52.96%).  
 
Statistics from DeKalb County (in hours): 
• Minimum: 1 hour 
• First quartile: 27 hours 
• Median: 76 hours 
• Third quartile: 287 hours 
• Maximum: 78,762 hours 
• Mean: 269.5 hours 
• Standard deviation: 730.9 hours 
 
For people who eventually bonded out with cash or 
surety: 
• Median: 36 hours (1.5 days) 
• Mean: 103 hours (4.2 days), standard deviation 370 hours 
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For people who eventually signed own recognizance: 
• Median: 81 hours (3.3 days) 
• Mean: 229 hours (9.5 days), standard deviation 459 hours 
 
Table 4: DeKalb County Misdemeanor  
Arrests ≥ 3 Days in Jail 
Year Percentage above 3 days 
2000 55.34% (4,999/9,033) 
2001 57.59% (2,616/4,542) 
2002 66.25% (6,075/9,169) 
2003 66.44% (6,772/10,192) 
2004 57.59% (6,291/10,922) 
2005 64.64% (6,933/10,725) 
2006 66.50% (7,758/11,666) 
2007 63.43% (6,891/10,863) 
2008 65.55% (6,464/9,860) 
2009 63.11% (6,404/10,147) 
2010 57.63% (6,257/10,857) 
2011 55.95% (6,379/11,401) 
2012 53.56% (6,097/11,382) 
2013 51.41% (5,431/10,563) 
2014 39.54% (3,372/8,528) 
2015 39.75% (3,766/9,473) 
2016 39.54% (3,372/8,528) 
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2017 33.29% (5,137/15,431) 
2018 33.29% (5,137/15,431) 
2019 26.50% (3,421/12,909) 
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X. APPENDIX D: DATA FROM MONTHLY JAIL REPORTS  
The Georgia Department of Community Affairs publishes 
monthly jail reports in collaboration with the Georgia Sheriffs’ 
Association, Georgia Crime Information Center, and Georgia 
Bureau of Investigation.161 Each report documents the number of 
inmates awaiting trial in each county’s jail on a specified date each 
month. The data also includes each county’s population on the 
reporting date. For each county, we calculated the “per capita 
pretrial detention rate” on each reporting date during 2019 by 
dividing the number of pretrial detainees by the county’s total 
population. Then, for each county, we calculated the average of the 
per capita detention rates as reported in the twelve months of 2019. 
 
Table 1: Average Daily Pretrial Detention Rate  
(average daily pretrial detainees per thousand residents, 
2019) 
Ware 6.7 Pulaski 2.9 Jackson 1.9 
Spalding 6.0 Walker 2.9 Macon 1.9 
Chatham 5.8 Treutlen 2.9 Telfair 1.9 
Coffee 5.3 Oglethorpe 2.9 Fannin 1.9 
Troup 5.0 Effingham 2.9 Hancock 1.9 
Randolph 5.0 Toombs 2.9 Newton 1.8 
Crisp 4.9 Peach 2.9 Franklin 1.8 
Dougherty 4.8 Wilkinson 2.8 Hall 1.8 
Muscogee 4.5 Bleckley 2.8 Screven 1.8 
Dodge 4.4 Heard 2.8 Candler 1.8 
Butts 4.4 Brooks 2.7 Lincoln 1.7 
Sumter 4.4 Terrell 2.7 Hart 1.7 
Stephens 4.3 Emanuel 2.7 Dekalb 1.7 
Dooly 4.2 Grady 2.7 Jenkins 1.7 
Lowndes 4.1 Dade 2.6 Worth 1.7 
Ben hill 4.1 Catoosa 2.6 Cherokee 1.6 
Colquitt 3.9 Mitchell 2.6 Gwinnett 1.6 
Richmond 3.9 Brantley 2.6 Jeff davis 1.6 
 
 161  See Monthly Jail Reports, supra note 121. We thank Dr. Tyler Reinagel for making the 
underlying data available to us in .csv format. 
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Thomas 3.8 Appling 2.6 Fayette 1.6 
Floyd 3.8 Liberty 2.5 Wheeler 1.5 
Rabun 3.6 Glynn 2.5 Coweta 1.5 
Burke 3.6 Putnam 2.5 Baldwin 1.5 
Seminole 3.6 Gilmer 2.5 Atkinson 1.5 
Douglas 3.6 Clarke 2.4 Greene 1.5 
Upson 3.5 Wilkes 2.4 Columbia 1.5 
Mcintosh 3.5 Jones 2.4 Marion 1.4 
Bulloch 3.4 Bibb 2.3 Banks 1.4 
Decatur 3.4 Dawson 2.3 Henry 1.4 
Bartow 3.4 Taylor 2.3 Pickens 1.3 
Monroe 3.4 Jasper 2.3 Evans 1.2 
Carroll 3.3 Lee 2.3 Madison 1.2 
Habersham 3.3 Calhoun 2.2 Tift 1.2 
Walton 3.2 Lumpkin 2.2 Polk 1.2 
Haralson 3.2 Houston 2.2 Crawford 1.1 
Gordon 3.2 Irwin 2.2 Union 1.1 
Mcduffie 3.1 Fulton 2.2 Cook 1.1 
Barrow 3.1 Camden 2.0 Paulding 1.0 
Pierce 3.1 Early 2.0 Forsyth 1.0 
White 3.1 Miller 2.0 Pike 0.9 
Murray 3.1 Cobb 2.0 Bryan 0.9 
Elbert 3.1 Tattnall 2.0 Clayton 0.8 
Towns 3.0 Treutlen 2.9 Schley 0.8 
Rockdale 3.0 Oglethorpe 2.9 Turner 0.7 
Whitfield 3.0 Effingham 2.9 Harris 0.7 
Laurens 3.0 Toombs 2.9 Chattooga 0.6 
Morgan 3.0 Peach 2.9 Oconee 0.6 
Meriwether 2.9 Wilkinson 2.8 Lamar 0.5 
    Johnson 0.3 
Washington, Wilcox, Bacon, Baker, Berrien, 
Charlton, Chattahoochee, Clay, Clinch, Echols, 
Glascock, Jefferson, Lanier, Long, Montgomery, 
Quitman, Talbot, Taliaferro, Twiggs, Warren, 
Wayne, Webster 0.0 
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We note several limitations of this analysis. First, we have no 
firsthand knowledge of the data-collection process. Second, the 
pretrial detention rates we report here should not be conclusively 
interpreted as a reflection of each county’s bail and detention 
practices. Other factors may influence these rates, notably 
including underlying arrest rates and the extent to which a county’s 
jail houses pretrial detainees for neighboring counties that do not 
have jails themselves. 
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XI. APPENDIX E: SAMPLE FINANCIAL AFFIDAVITS 
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Assets (Things you own) and Debts (Things you owe): 
LIQUID ASSETS AMOUNT DEBT AMOUNT 
Cash on Hand / Bank (or available 
stocks, bonds, etc) 
 
$ 
Outstanding Credit Card Debt $ 
Equity in Real Estate (value of 
property less what you owe) 
 
$ 
Outstanding Mortgage $ 
Equity in Personal Property (such as 
value of stereo, furniture, jewelry, 
etc.) 
 
$ 
Outstanding Student Loans $ 
Other $ Outstanding Car Loan $ 
Do you own anything else of value? $ Other $ 
TOTAL LIQUID ASSETS $ TOTAL OUTSTANDING DEBTS $ 
If you are currently experiencing a financial hardship (including disability, debts, expenses, or loss of 
income not listed above), please explain this situation in as much detail as possible: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ ______________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
If you chose to complete this form, check ONE of the following: 
 ___ I can read and understand English, and I have read and understand each question and instruction 
on this form in completing the form, OR 
 ___ An interpreter read to me every question and instruction on this form and my answer to every 
question in __________________,  a language in which I am fluent, and I understood everything, OR 
___ I did not understand each question or instruction on this form, because: _____________________ 
_____________________________________________________________ _______________________   
I swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that all of the above information is true and correct to the best 
of my knowledge. 
 
  This  _________ day of  _____________________________ ,  ___________. 
   (day)   (month)    (year) 
 
 
       Signature: ________________________  
       Printed name: ________________________  
______________________________________________________________________________ __________ 
To be completed by Glynn County Detention Center administrative staff 
 
Person providing this affidavit to affiant/applicant:  ________________________________ __________ 
 
Interpreter (if any) used (in language: _____________) __________________________________ ________ 
Printed Name and Title 
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BAIL DETERMINATION ORDER 
 
To be completed by the Magistrate Judge or other judicial official at time of bond determination 
 
 Having considered the foregoing affidavit of financial hardship, as well as the factors set forth in 
O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e)(2), this Court finds that (complete only (1) or (2) below): 
(1) 
_______ The affiant/applicant does have a financial hardship and inability to meet the standard bond amount as 
set forth in the applicable bail schedule that warrants a waiver or reduction of bail, therefore, this Court orders 
that (complete only one of the following): 
(_____) The affiant/applicant shall be required to post a reduced bond in the amount of $__________ 
which the Court finds that the affiant/applicant can pay. 
(_____) The affiant/applicant shall be released on an unsecured bond in the amount of $ __________. 
 (_____) The affiant/applicant shall be released on recognizance without a monetary bond.   
OR 
(2) 
_______ The affiant/applicant does not have a financial hardship and inability to meet the standard bond amount 
as set forth in the applicable bail schedule that warrants a waiver or reduction of bail and therefore bail is set 
pursuant to the bail schedule in the amount of $_____________ . 
 
 
 SO ORDERED THIS ___________ day of _________________________, _________________. 
 
 
       ___________________________ _____________________  
       Judicial Officer’s Signature  
 
Printed Name: ___________________________ ________ 
 
       Title:  ____________________________________  
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